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 Abstract 
 
This thesis reviews the implementation of Environmental Management System at a 
construction company. The object of the study is the Gottlieb Skanska construction site at 
Shaft 10 of the Delaware Aqueduct at the West Branch reservoir north of New York City.  
 
The thesis emphasizes the current identification of environmental aspects and risk 
assessment and presents a quantitative alternative to this process. The alternative approach 
is applied on the construction site both with and without implemented preventive controls. 
A comparative risk analysis is carried out and contrasted to the current procedures.  
 
The analysis  shows that the controls have a tremendous impact on the risk of pollution from 
activities at Shaft 10 to the West Branch reservoir. Regarding the relative effect on the total 
environmental impact, the change foremost reflects the effectiveness of the controls; 
especially those aimed at the most severe hazards like discharge of PCB, Mercury and Lead. 
 
The greatest threats to the water of West Branch reservoir after the controls are 
implemented seem to be spillage, mostly from workers and trucks. Manual spill will be the 
sole greatest contributor to discharges, since humans more easily slip through preventive 
systems.  
 
In comparison with the present risk assessment, the Quantitative Risk Analysis results do 
not deviate much from the current outcomes, although it in more detail addresses 
environmental threats. The strength of this probabilistic approach is in using available data 
and opinions to statistically determine whether conclusions can be drawn, providing “hard 
numbers” for decisions regarding allocation of resources toward protective actions. 
 
Since Quantitative Risk Analysis provides an assessment of environmental safety, and 
safety in turn is highly dependent on environmental management, the link between 
Quantitative Risk Analysis and environmental management is crucial for minimizing 
environmental impact.  
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1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the background and purpose of the Thesis. In addition, the 
delimitations setting the framework for the Thesis are explained.  
 
1.1 Background 
Standardized Environmental Management Systems (EMS) are widely spread in the 
corporate world. These systems were first introduced in Japan’s electronic industry 
in the 1980’s and later adapted by American and European corporations, pioneered 
by the Chemical and Power Industries and followed by other firms with less 
environmental impact1.  
 
Important reasons for firms to implement EMS has been more stringent legislation 
in recent years and pressure from customers, which have given them incentives to 
take environmental aspects into consideration during planning, production and 
waste handling, as well as to further develop environmental control and auditing 
systems2. Also, EMS is considered an efficient mean to improve a firm’s use of 
resources, to decrease the probability of adverse publicity and to strengthen the 
confidence from investors and the public3.  
 
Swedish contractors began systemizing their commitment to environmental 
improvements in the mid- and late-90’s by building up environmental strategies, 
formulating environmental policies and implementing Environmental Management 
Systems4. As the largest construction company in Sweden, and globally the third 
largest contractor outside of Japan as of 20035, Skanska had all its business units 
ISO 14001-certified by 2000 which demanded, among other things, the business 
units to implement their own EMS. This was done mainly to strengthen Skanska’s 
brand, to perform better risk management and to ensure that current and future 
employees work in a safe environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Purpose and Delimitation 
                                                          
1  SIS FORUM AB, 1998, p.18 
2 Hyödynmaa, 2002, p.22 
3 SIS FORUM AB, 1998, p.37 
4 Hyödynmaa 2002, p.19 
5 www, Skanska 
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The purpose is to: 
 
• Review Gottlieb Skanska’s operations in general and the contract 
DEL-159 in particular (chapter 5). 
 
• Describe the processes at the reconstruction of Shaft 10 of the 
Delaware Aqueduct System that cause environmental aspects to 
arise; in addition to review the regulations affecting the 
reconstruction site (chapters 6 and 8). 
 
• Appraise Gottlieb Skanska’s identification of the environmental 
aspects, the assessment of the aspects likelihood and 
consequences and the measures taken to reduce the overall 
environmental risk generated by the reconstruction of Shaft 10 
(chapter 7).  
 
• Review theoretical Quantitative Risk Analysis methods of 
interest for an alternative assessment of the environmental risks 
at the Shaft #10 reconstruction site (chapter 9).  
 
• Construct risk-capturing simulation models in accordance with 
the theory to apply on the Shaft 10 reconstruction site (chapter 
10).  
 
The scope of this Thesis is limited to working processes at the Shaft 10 
reconstruction site and the Environmental Management System currently deployed 
at the site. This implies that any other associated operation or Management System 
in use outside the gates of the site is not considered in the study. Neither is the 
safety or health elements of the integrated Safety, Health and Environmental 
Management System considered. 
 
The descriptive parts of the study pay attention to a wide range of aspects related 
to the implementation of the Environmental Management System at the site, while 
the quantitative analysis only focuses on the identification of environmental 
aspects and the subsequent risk assessment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Method 
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This chapter describes the general method used to carry out the project and how 
the work proceeds throughout the different stages. The sources of information are 
of six kinds: literature, general company information, interviews, site tours, 
numerical data and surveys. Readings and articles constitute the theoretical 
framework for the applications. Information from the project and the numerical 
data is used in various analyses and models to form a platform for further 
conclusions.  
 
2.1 Literature  
A broad range of literature is used to elucidate theory from the Environmental 
Management field, OR and Statistics. Other sources of information are the Gottlieb 
Skanska Safety, Health and Environmental Management System, instruction 
guidelines for contractors, regulatory documents and Skanska’s annual and 
environmental reports. General information about Skanska, hazardous materials, 
the Delaware aqueduct, regulations and the ISO 14001 certification is gathered 
from the internet.  
 
2.2 Working method  
Information from interviews, tours around the construction area and the internet is 
assembled to make up the descriptive parts. Three interviews at the construction 
site and two site-tours are conducted to gain general knowledge about current 
conditions and procedures at the Shaft 10 site. Information is collected throughout 
the writing process from the Safety, Health and Environmental Management 
System (SHEMS) and monitoring data from environmental audits for previous 
construction projects.  
 
2.2.1 Basis for the analysis 
For the quantitative analysis surveys and figures from old environmental audits are 
used. The intention is to use as much “real life” data for the various environmental 
aspects as possible rather than to rely on assumptions. Nevertheless, due to lack of 
both data about discharges from this specific construction site (because the project 
was in an initial phase when the study was made and no data existed) and relevant 
historical data from similar projects, the analysis is mostly based on “expert 
opinion” gathered from surveys. Historical data exist to a certain degree, but is not 
available. The only exception is the numbers used for the probability distribution 
for discharges of Asbestos, which comes from an internal environmental audit for 
a previous Gottlieb Skanska construction project.  
 
This lack of real life data is a shortcoming in the sense that the simulation is mostly 
based on assumptions. The Monte Carlo simulation technique used in the analysis 
can be run with estimated data and models can be modeled in whatever level of 
detail required however, which is an advantage in comparison with other analytical 
methods.  
 
2.2.2 Assumptions 
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The assumptions are of two kinds: estimates of the amounts of discharges to the 
West Branch reservoir from the activities at the construction site that are classified 
as environmental aspects before and after preventive controls are in place and 
estimates about each discharge’s severity.  
 
The estimates of the amounts are gathered through a survey aimed at the safety 
engineer and construction workers at the site. The safety engineer and 7 
construction workers answered the survey and their answers are used to set up 
intervals for each aspect’s probability distribution in the simulation model.  
 
The questionnaire consists of questions considering the employees opinion about 
the probability of amount of leakage, and ask for their opinion about a) the 
practical minimum of discharges, b) the most likely amount of discharges, c) the 
practical maximum amount of discharges, d) the probability that the discharges 
could be below a, e) the probability that the discharges could be below c. The 
answers are weighted and an average number is extracted for each aspect. These 
values are used in Trigen distributions for every aspect in the Microsoft add-in 
@Risk for the simulation, described in detail in chapter 10. A challenge at this 
stage is to inform the questioned people about what is asked for to get as close to 
the reality as possible.  
 
To account for the aspect’s impact on the water, a 1-10 scale is used. These 
severity factors come from an interview directed to an official at the New York 
City Department of Environmental Protection. This person is the most reliable 
source available for the study.  
 
The most favorable scenario would of course be to have full access to historical 
data about discharges from previous similar construction projects. When that is not 
the case, the above mentioned approach seems to be the closest one gets to capture 
the probability of discharges from the Shaft 10 construction site.  
 
2.2.3 Analytical approach 
The quantitative analysis follows a three step approach composed of: 1) aspect 
identification (Hazop Analysis); 2) a visual depiction of how the activities at the 
site could lead to discharges (Fault Tree Analysis) and 3) two simulations of the 
amount of discharges released to the reservoir, before and after the preventive 
controls are implemented.  
 
The aspect identification is conducted through on-site tours and interviews with 
the safety engineer, while the Fault Tree Analysis is an extension of the 
identification and is based on interviews. For the simulation, each aspect’s severity 
factor is multiplied with its probability distribution before and after the preventive 
controls and added up to construct the objective function, which is total 
environmental impact to the reservoir from the activities.  
 
2.2.4 Failed extension of the analysis 
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As a continuation of the Quantitative Risk Analysis, a Cost-Benefit Analysis is 
intended to show how much resources are worth spending on the EMS.  
 
Because neither the costs of the implementation of the EMS at the Shaft 10 
construction site, a feasible interest rate, or the benefits in monetary terms are 
available, the Cost-Benefit Analysis is restricted to a theoretical discussion. The 
idea is to discount the benefits and costs from the EMS and find a net present 
value, positive or negative, of the EMS.  
 
 
3. Skanska 
This chapter briefly reviews organization, markets and financial performance of 
Skanska and its operating unit Gottlieb Skanska.  
 
3.1 Parent Company 
Skanska is a multinational company performing construction-related services and 
project development. Home markets are Sweden, the US, UK, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Poland, the Czech Republic and Argentina6. In 2004 Total Assets 
amounted to SEK 62.5 billion ($8.5 billion) and the company had a turnover of 
SEK 121 billion ($16.5 billion)7(see appendix A).  
 
The average number of employees in the group is 53,9818 of which approximately 
9,100 work in the US9.  
 
Skanska operates in the US through two divisions, Skanska USA Building and 
Skanska USA Civil10. The latter is comprised of ten operating units providing 
construction services to public and private organizations in the civil, mechanical, 
industrial, marine, foundation, and environmental market sectors11 (see appendix 
B). 
 
3.2 Gottlieb Skanska 
Gottlieb Skanska is a business unit within the Skanska USA Civil division. The 
unit operates in the greater New York City area and is headquartered in Queens, 
NY. The firm undertakes a wide variety of construction and rehabilitation projects, 
including rail and bus maintenance facilities, subway stations, fan plants, high-rise 
                                                          
6 www, Skanska 
7 Skanska Annual Report, p.39 and 40 
8 Skanska Six Months Report January-June 2005, p.6 
9 www, Skanska USA 
10 www, Skanska 
11 www, Skanska USA Civil 
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apartment complexes, toll booth plazas, warehouse and office projects and water 
supply and treatment facilities. Clients are both private and public12. 
 
Gottlieb Skanska has a bonding capacity of $3.5 billion and a staff of over 400 
employees. The firm has a backlog of orders of over $711 million. 
 
4. Contract DEL-159 
This chapter reviews the Gottlieb Skanska reconstruction project at Shafts 9, 10 
and 17 of the Delaware Aqueduct System. The working conditions at the three job-
sites are similar, and emphasize is laid on the work at Shaft 10 at the West Branch 
Reservoir, of the East of Hudson Watersheds.  
  
4.1 The Delaware Aqueduct System 
The Aqueduct System was built 1937-1962 and is 105 miles (170 km) long.13. 
Water for the system is impounded in three upstate reservoir systems, including 19 
reservoirs and three controlled lakes with a storage capacity of approximately 580 
billion gallons (2 196 billion liters). The tunnel supplies more than half of New 
York City’s water, with about 95 percent of the total water supply delivered by 
gravity14 (See appendix C) 
 
The connection between a reservoir and the aqueduct system is called a Shaft. It 
encompasses gates to control the water flow in and out of the reservoir. Shaft 9, 10 
and 17 were all built in 1941.  
 
4.2 The Contract 
Contract DEL-159 was issued November 28th 2003 to remediate any potential 
mercury and PCB sources of contamination found in Shafts 9, 10, and 17 of the 
Delaware Aqueduct System, owned by the New York City Department of 
Environmental Protection. Contamination sources of the toxic substances generally 
originate from the degradation of the original motor actuator seals installed circa 
194115. The contract also involves removal of materials containing Asbestos and 
lead paint inside the Shaft.  
 
The three job-sites represent similar work conditions but the effort varies in 
magnitude depending on the size of the shafts, where Shaft 10 is largest and Shaft 
9 is the smallest. Shafts 9 and 10 are both located in Putnam County, NY, while 
Shaft 17 is in Westchester County, NY, 30 miles further south16. 
 
                                                          
 12 www, Gottlieb Skanska 
 13 www, NYC Department of Environmnetal Protection 
 14 www, Great Achievements 
 15 www, Gottlieb Skanska 
 16 Pers. med., Pappalardo, 2005 
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The reconstruction project spans over 75 months and will thus be finished 2010. 
The project is of environmental rehabilitation nature and is carried out 
simultaneously at the three job-sites. The value of the contract is $134 Million.  
 
4.3 Shaft 10 Operation Procedures  
The objective of reconstructing Shaft 10 is to replace all the materials that are no 
longer acceptable from an environmental point of view, in addition to upgrading 
certain components of the shaft.  
 
4.3.1 Hazardous materials in Shaft 10 
The hazardous materials that were originally used in the construction of Shaft 10 
include (see appendix D): 
PCB 
PCBs (Polychlorinated Biphenyls) are mixtures of synthetic organic chemicals 
with the same basic chemical structure and similar physical properties ranging 
from oily liquids to waxy solids. Due to their non-flammability, chemical stability, 
high boiling point and electrical insulating properties, PCBs were used in hundreds 
of industrial and commercial applications17. PCB persists in the nature for a long 
time and accumulates in plants, animals and fishes causing cancer and deformation 
of offspring. Concern over the toxicity and persistence in the environment of PCBs 
led US Congress in 1976 to enact §6(e) of the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA) that included among other things, prohibitions on the manufacture, 
processing, and distribution in commerce of PCBs. 
Mercury 
Mercury is a naturally occurring element that is found in air, water and soil. It 
exists in several forms: elemental or metallic mercury, inorganic mercury 
compounds, and organic mercury compounds. Mercury is an element in the earth's 
crust. Humans cannot create or destroy mercury. Pure mercury is a liquid metal, 
sometimes referred to as quicksilver that volatizes readily. It has traditionally been 
used to make products like thermometers, switches, and some light bulbs. Mercury 
exposure at high levels can harm the brain, heart, kidneys, lungs, and immune 
system of people of all ages18.  
 
Lead  
 
Lead is a metal found naturally in the environment as well as in manufactured 
products.  The major sources of lead emissions have historically been motor 
vehicles (such as cars and trucks) and industrial sources.  Due to the phase out of 
leaded gasoline, metals processing is the major source of lead emissions to the air 
today. The highest levels of lead in air are generally found near lead smelters. 
Other stationary sources are waste incinerators, utilities, and lead-acid battery 
                                                          
17 www, EPA, 1 
18 www, EPA, 2 
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manufacturers19. Lead is a highly toxic metal that was used for many years in 
products found in and around our homes. Lead may cause a range of health effects, 
from behavioral problems and learning disabilities, to seizures and death.  
 
Asbestos  
 
Asbestos is the name given to a number of naturally occurring fibrous silicate 
minerals that have been mined for their useful properties such as thermal 
insulation, chemical and thermal stability and high tensile strength. The three most 
common types of Asbestos are 1) Chrysotile, b) Amosite and c) Crocidolite. 
Asbestos can only be identified under a microscope. Gottlieb Skanska has not 
identified which type of Asbestos it is removing, though Chrystolite is the most 
common type in buildings and makes up approximately 90%-95% of all Asbestos 
contained in buildings in the United States20. 
Asbestos is made up of microscopic fibres that may become airborne when 
distributed. These fibres may become inhaled into the lungs, where they may cause 
significant health problems. The greater and the longer the exposure, the greater is 
the risk of contracting Asbestos related diseases. These health problems include 
the lung disease Asbestosis and lung cancer. 
 
Remediation of these environmental hazards is a crucial part in the working 
process, and it has to take place before starting the reconstruction work inside the 
Shaft. 
 
4.3.2 Project stages 
This chapter will review the chain of stages that compose the project throughout 
the 75-months period21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
  19 www, EPA, 3 
  20 www, EPA, 4 
  21 Pers. med., Pappalardo, 2005 
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     Chart 1: Major stages of the project (source: own) 
 
 
Step 1: Preparations 
 
In this stage the construction job-site is created. Preceding planning reaches its 
climax and central features such as amount and timing of material supplies and 
project working force expertise is settled on. Mobile offices, temporary car lots, 
machines and material are gathered and brought in place. The first construction 
plans, routines and systems are formed and implemented. Initiating actions are 
taken to make sure the job-site meets Safety and Environmental Standards, which 
will be further described in chapter 822. 
 
Step 2: Remediation of hazardous materials 
 
Gottlieb Skanska ought to remediate all environmental hazards before starting the 
reconstruction inside the Shaft. This work begins with the removal of Asbestos 
found in the ceiling material and around the windows, followed by abatement of 
lead in the paint on walls, bricks and handrails inside the Shaft. Once the lead 
abatement is done, it opens up work for other trades, which Gottlieb Skanska has 
no control of, like pluming, electrical work and HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, Air 
Conditioning)23.  
 
The next task for Gottlieb Skanska is the elimination of PCB and Mercury 
contamination. The PCB was until this project started used in the cones in the 
                                                          
22 Pers. med., Pappalardo, 2005 
23 Guided tour, 2005 
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operators controlling the gates of the Shaft. When constructing the operators, PCB 
was considered a feasible material for the cones thanks to its ability to stand 
friction and heat well. The liquid mercury was used in the operators for creating a 
seal when the gates would close24.Throughout the years these materials started 
leaking and contamination has been found at the gate wells which control the flow 
of water from the reservoirs to the Delaware Aqueduct and vice versa25.  
 
Step 3: Removal and restoration of the operators and stop shutters 
 
The 7 operators of Shaft 10 contain PCB to dissipate the friction created while 
opening the gates and Mercury to form a seal when the gates close. The PCB and 
Mercury have to be eliminated and replaced with other substances. To perform this 
step, the operators first need to be displaced from their function and concealed in 
protective cover, one by one. Second, wood blocking is placed under 2 sheets of 
poly to create a containment area which the operator gets lowered into by crane. 
The operator is then taken apart and the hazardous materials are removed and 
replaced by other materials. This work area is cordoned off with caution tape and 
Shaft doors are kept close while the restoration of the operator is undertaken. All 
contaminated material, like water and rags, and removed PCB and Mercury are 
placed into an approved labeled drum for hazardous waste.  
 
The stop shutters are intermediate valves for the gates located close to the gates 40 
feet under the ground floor of the Shaft. The Shutters are painted with lead paint, 
which has to be removed. For the restoration, the stop shutters are placed in 
storage racks with the use of an over head crane. The work area is cordoned off 
with caution tape, shaft doors will be closed and air monitoring is conducted 
during wet brushing procedure. Loose lead containing paint flakes will be scraped 
off, followed by vacuuming. Subsequently, cleaning solution is applied to the 
entire stop shutter and then wiped off with rags soaked with water; the water is 
then vacuumed from both the stop shutter and the containment area. All water, 
removed scale and rags are placed into an approved labeled drum for hazardous 
waste.  
 
The removal of the Operators and Stop Shutters demands the flow of water in and 
out of the reservoir to stop. The timing of the removal depends on when Gottlieb 
Skanska gets  permission to shut the water off, which affects the water supply to 
New York City. The company has to give its client, the NYCDEP enough notice 
and subsequently receive the permission to close one or more gate(s) for each 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: Reconstruction of the building’s interiors.  
 
                                                          
  24 Pers. med., Pappalardo, 2005 
  25 www, Gottlieb Skanska 
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Following the restoration of the operators and stop shutters, the water pipe gates in 
the sub terrain area of the Shaft have to be replaced. The gates are too old to be 
safe in the future and are built with outdated but not hazardous materials, among 
them wood. These control devices are installed below the water level, 40 feet 
under the ground floor of the shaft26. 
 
While replacing the gates one by one, temporarily barriers for the water flow need 
to be constructed. This procedure also demands permission from the NYDEP, 
which has the potential of creating a considerable amount of slack time throughout 
the project.  
 
In addition to the reconstruction of the gates, a number of less central 
modifications of the Shaft are made. These modifications include restructure of the 
drainage system, new electrical cables and installation of heating, ventilation, and 
air conditioning (HVAC) arrangements27.  
 
An extension of the Shaft is also constructed to shelter the control room. 
 
4.4 Organization at the reconstruction site.  
Skanska’s organization follows a 5-stage hierarchy where employees at each level 
work independent to a large extent, much due to the decentralized nature of the 
company’s operations. Work settings like construction sites and offices are flexible 
and this fosters on-site managers and workers to make own decisions.  
 
The organizational structure is adapted by Skanska’s operational units in the US 
and it is represented at Gottlieb Skanska as follows:  
 
1. Upper echelon, president and vice presidents 
2. Project Manager and management teams 
3. Superintendent 
4. Foremen 
5. The laborer him/her-self 
 
At the Delaware Aqueduct reconstructions of Shafts 9, 10 and 17, a project 
manager is responsible for the whole project, which includes cost-effectiveness, 
productivity and safety. A Superintendent is responsible for each Shaft 
reconstruction and foremen, including the safety engineer, control various 
processes at the reconstruction site28.  
 
                                                          
26 The 9th of September 2005 the asbestos removal is finalized and Gottlieb Skanska is in progress of 
cementing procedures regarding lead abatement for approval of the owner, New York Department of 
Environmental Protection (NYDEP).  
 
27 Guided tour, 2005 
28 Pers. med., Quinn, 2005 
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The flow of information between the levels, both up and down, is of greatest 
importance as regards implementing management systems and communicating its 
causes and effects, which will be more thoroughly considered in chapter 8.  
 
Two subcontractors are hired for the Delaware Aqueduct reconstructions: 
Montesano Brothers; performing civil services and excavations, and Hazardous 
Elimination Corp; handling hazardous wastes29. Gottlieb Skanska also uses other 
entrepreneurs for electrical work, pluming and heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning (HVAC). The subcontractors have to compile with Gottlieb 
Skanska’s Safety and Environmental Management System while the entrepreneurs 
do not30.  
   
 
5. Environmental Management 
This chapter reviews the environmental impact from the reconstruction of Shaft 10 
and how Gottlieb Skanska’s EMS is used to control the environmental effects. The 
chapter also explicates the objectives of the EMS, its implementation and the 
control of its fulfillment. A brief overview of Gottlieb Skanska’s environmental 
certification is presented as well.   
 
5.1 The ISO-14001 Certification 
ISO 14001 was first published in 1996 and specifies the actual requirements for an 
environmental management system. It can be adopted by any organization and it 
applies to those environmental aspects which the organization has control over and 
which it is expected to have an influence on31.  
 
ISO 14001 is often seen as the corner stone standard of the ISO 14000 series. 
However, it is not only the most well known, but also the only ISO 14000 standard 
against which it is currently possible to be certified by an external certification 
authority. It does not itself state specific environmental performance criteria32.   
 
Since December 31, 2000 all Skanska business units are certified according to the 
ISO-14001 standard33. All new acquires need to be certified within two years after 
the acquisition34.  The independent business units within the civil division in the 
US have their own registration with ISO-14001 and need to meet the standards just 
like the parent company, which implies that they must have an EMS of their own 
and conduct internal audits, as well as being subject to external audits. In the 
situation where two business units carry out a joint project, the leading unit is 
                                                          
  29 Pers. med., Pappalardo, 2005 
  30 The 9th of September full working force is approximately 25 men per shift  
  31 Edwards, 2004, p.2 
  32 www, EPA, 5 
  33 Skanska Sustainability Report, 2004, p.2 
  34 www, ISO-14001 Certification 
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responsible for accomplishing the environmental objectives and its management 
system is used throughout the project period35. 
 
5.2 The Safety, Health and Environmental Management System  
To fulfil the requirements for the ISO-14001 Certification, Gottlieb Skanska has 
developed a comprehensive system covering all aspects of importance for the 
standard: the Safety, Health and Environmental Management System36. As the 
name suggests, the system also covers safety issues and is in compliance with the 
OSHAS-18001 Safety Standards, which procedures and implementation are 
beyond the scope of this text. Henceforth the notion of EMS will equal the part of 
the SHEMS concerning environmental issues.  
 
The SHEMS is composed of generic procedures which have to be gone through 
thoroughly for each project Gottlieb Skanska undertakes. Each procedure’s 
purpose and scope are defined and templates and checklists used to carry it out are 
shown as attachments.  
 
For the purpose of this text, Procedure 1 is of most interest. The first part of 
Procedure 1 handles identification and management of significant environmental 
aspects, while the second part considers determining of risk assessment and 
requirements for hazard identification37. 
 
5.3 Current Implementation of the EMS at Shaft 10 
As shown in chart 2, the environmental are addressed at an early stage of the 
reconstruction project, most of them before the actual work starts. Initially, the 
future environmental aspects are identified and their inherited likelihood and 
severity is assessed. Subsequently, preventive actions to decrease either one of the 
two parameters take place and they get tested for again. After the second test and 
eventual improvements, the environmental issues are controlled for by the EMS, 
which will run with regular maintenance and updates throughout the project.  
 
 
                                                          
35 Pers. med., Quinn, 2005 
36 Gottlieb Skanska SHEMS, 2005, p.2 
37 Gottlieb Skanska SHEMS, 2005, p.5 and p.7 
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    Chart 2: Implementation of the EMS (source: own)  
 
 
5.3.1 Identification of Significant Environmental Aspects. 
The purpose of this procedure is to identify environmental aspects of the 
organization’s activities in order to set objectives and targets that can be achieved 
through the implementation of the SHEMS. 
 
Identifying the significant environmental aspects of the activities at the job-site is 
the first step of the EMS implementation and takes place before the actual work 
starts. Any feature of the site that gets checked with a “yes” or “maybe” on a 
Checklist for Environmental Aspects gets examined. If the feature meets one of the 
following criteria:38. 
 
• Any regulated aspect or aspect deemed significant by a client (law or 
required by contract) 
• Probable human exposure to hazardous substance. 
• A solid waste stream that can be profitable recycled or re-used.  
• Any situation that receives two or more complaints within a 30 day 
period. 
• Any contaminated waste that cannot be disposed of as solid waste in 
regular trash dumpsters. 
                                                          
     38 Gottlieb Skanska SHEMS, 2005, p.9 
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• A resource conservation or operational improvement that is 5% or more 
than the value of the project.  
• Any situation that could result in adverse publicity or negative public 
opinion.  
 
it is considered significant and listed in a Summary of Significant Environmental 
Aspects39  (see appendix E).  
 
After involving Senior Environmental Management of Gottlieb Skanska, the 
Safety Engineer responsible for environmental safety found three topical issues 
that are considered significant at the Shaft 10 reconstruction site: Extensive 
disruption to or displacement of the soil, discharge to a public water system and 
generation, transport, storage, or disposal of regulated hazardous waste. These 
aspects get identified on a Hazard Category Worksheet.  
 
In addition, a Safety, Health and Environmental Program (SHEMP) is filled out for 
each of the three Significant Environmental Aspects. The SHEMP includes 
definition of objectives, indicators to measure their achievement, required training, 
tasks and responsible parties. It is used in conjunction with the Construction Plan, 
which will be further investigated in chapter 7.3.2, to ensure a complete 
information cycle40.  
 
The above steps are followed to create the baseline of significant environmental 
aspects upon which the SHEMS is to be built.  
 
5.3.2 Risk Assessment and Hazard Identification 
Hazard identification and risk assessment is conducted on two levels. First, as part 
of the initial management review, potential onsite hazards will be identified by 
means of a pre-set core list of hazards. Management of each hazard is generic by 
nature and intended to be the minimum requirements that are expected in the 
management of each hazard. Second, for each individual activity, hazards will 
further be identified and managed in Construction Plans.  
 
Once the Hazard Category Worksheet and the SHEMP are completed, 
Construction Plans for each construction activity at the job-site are assembled, 
which contain a magnitude of information, including significant environmental 
aspects and risk assessment of that particular activity. 
 
The scope of the work is used to break down the activity into specific and detailed 
sequential tasks, allowing for an analysis of the hazards involved.  
 
For the purpose of Risk Assessment, triggers are used as the means to identify and 
control the risk for that activity. Triggers are defined as any:  piece of equipment; 
tool; and material that have been identified as part of the scope of work and will be 
                                                          
39 Gottlieb Skanska SHEMS, 2005, p.14 
40 Gottlieb Skanska SHEMS, 2005, p.6 
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utilized at some point in the activity. Once the triggers and hazards have been 
identified, an initial risk level is applied to the specific task. The initial risk level is 
determined by using Risk Matrix System, which combines a four scale grading of 
likelihood of the event with a four scale grading of the severity of the event (see 
appendix F).  
 
Table 1 shows the results of the Initial Risk Assessment at the Shaft 10 site. The 
assessment accumulates all activities affected by each Significant Aspect at the 
reconstruction site and thus firstly depicts the overall initial likelihood and severity 
of the Significant Aspects respectively and secondly, the overall Initial Risk Level. 
The overall Initial Risk Level is here defined through the Risk Matrix as a 
combination of likelihood and severity. This way of depicting risks is called the 
Jonsson analysis where the risks are assessed in relative terms, not in units or 
monetary terms. It gives an idea about the risks weights, probability and 
consequence41. 
 
 
Table 1: Results of the Initial Risk Assessment (source: DEL-159 SHEMS) 
Significant 
Environmental Aspect 
Likelihood Severity Initial Risk Level 
Extensive disruption to 
or displacement of the 
soil 
Likely Major High 
Discharge to a public 
water system 
Very Likely Major High 
Transport, storage or 
disposal of regulated 
hazardous waste 
Seldom Moderate Moderate 
 
 
5.3.3 Reducing the environmental risks 
Once the significant environmental aspects are identified and documented and 
their likelihood and severity for various activities is assessed on the site, preventive 
actions are taken to minimize the risks. At this point in the process, the SHEMP 
that corresponds to that trigger should be used as the primary means of identifying 
control measures for that risk42. The following text reviews the engineering and 
routines aimed to minimize the environmental risk steaming from hazardous waste, 
leakage and soil erosion at the job-site. Since handling of hazardous waste is best 
described in the context of the entire waste handling process, the general waste 
handling procedure is described as well.  
 
5.3.3.1 Waste handling 
The waste at the reconstruction site is divided in three groups: General 
construction waste, non-hazardous regulated waste and hazardous waste.  
                                                          
  41 Hamilton, 1996, p.77 
  42 Pers. med., Quinn, 2005 
 17 
 
General waste, that hasn’t been in contact with hazardous substances, gets 
separated into metal, concrete, packaging from deliveries and miscellaneous 
debriefs (mixture of wood and cardboard) on the site and subsequently recycled or 
reused. Large containers are used to store the waste until it gets transported to a 
transfer station for further handling. Garbage from the mobile offices and workers 
is not recycled43. Wooden skids for various input materials are reused for 
stockpiling 
 
The waste generated from the reconstruction operations of Shaft 10 is separated 
into hazardous and non-hazardous. The hazardous waste gets packed in labeled 
drums and transported to regulated landfills. The hazardous waste consist of 
Asbestos, Lead paint, Mercury, oil spill and PCB, which is accounted for, 
weighted and disposed of properly. The hazardous waste drums stand in a wooden 
box to isolate eventual leakage and there is powder nearby to soak up leakage. All 
hazardous waste needs to be tested and brought off the job-site within 90 days 
after its generation. It gets transported to regulated landfills around the US, which 
only accept hazardous waste. These procedures are standardized and highly 
regulated44. 
 
All other material the reconstruction work generates is considered non-hazardous 
regulated waste.  
 
5.3.3.2 Procedures and Improvements to protect the water 
The water in the West Branch Reservoir is consumed in New York City. Anything 
that goes in the water gets to the drinking system. It is therefore of outmost 
importance to keep it protected from pollution.  
 
One of the major environmental challenges at the site is to prevent the fluid and 
solid emissions from the reconstruction operations from reaching the reservoir 
water. The activities at the site could also cause soil erosion, which affects the 
water in similar ways as leakage.  
 
In addition to general consciousness among workers and readiness to clean up 
eventual spillage, Gottlieb Skanska takes other measures to protect the water from 
contamination (see appendix G)45: 
 
• Drains at the site debouching to the reservoir are covered with Hay and 
rocks to prevent turbidity from reaching the water supply. The bales of 
hey and the rocks work as filters fluids except clean rain water from 
reaching the reservoir.  
 
                                                          
43 Pers. med., Pappalardo, 2005 
44 Pers. med., Quinn, 2005 
45 Pers. med., Quinn, 2005 
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• A Gabion Wall is raised circa 10 feet above the water line to prevent soil 
erosion. It is constructed of steel cages with chisel rocks inside and 
reaches 3 feet beneath the soil and around the water side of the site.  
 
• A Silt Fence is raised along the shore to prevent mud from reaching the 
water. In case the mud gets by the Gabion wall, it will be caught in the 
fence. It encircles around the water side of the site. 
 
• A Turbidity Curtain is placed in the water about 10 feet from the shore, 
which blocks floating contamination but lets water permeate through it. It 
is 1.5 feet deep and floats in the water around the site.  
 
• A 50 Х 20 feet Catch Basin has been dug out circa 40 feet from the shore 
as a natural filter for contaminated water. The dirty water will percolate 
into the ground before oozing into the reservoir.   
 
All of these three barriers are inspected once a week by an engineer and after any 
rainfall greater than 0.5 inch the barriers have to be inspected the next day.  
 
 
• The Department of Environmental Protection takes water samples from 
Floating Balloons in the water outside the site to test the water quality 
(tour around the site). 
 
Once these controls have been identified, and by assuming the controls are 
implemented as designed, the Residual Risk Level for the task is determined by 
applying the same Matrix system that was used to determine the Initial Risk Level. 
Table 2 shows the result of the Residual Risk Level after the controls have been 
implemented.  
 
 
Table 2: Results of the Residual Risk Assessment (source: DEL-159 SHEMS) 
Significant 
Environmental Aspect 
Likelihood Severity Residual Risk 
Level 
Extensive disruption to 
or displacement of the 
soil 
Seldom Major Medium 
Discharge to a public 
water system 
Seldom Major Medium 
Transport, storage or 
disposal of regulated 
hazardous waste 
Seldom Moderate Medium 
 
 
At the time of commencement of any activity, the highest remaining risk level will 
determine the activity’s overall risk level which is documented on the 
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acknowledgement sheet  attached to the Risk Assessment and Control 
Worksheet46.  
 
If the risk is classified as “extreme” post the efforts to mitigate it, the action will 
not be undertaken by Gottlieb Skanska. The customer will be refunded whatever 
amount allocated to that specific activity in the construction budget. If the risk of 
an activity is classified as “high”, the President or the Vice President has to sign 
the Acknowledgement Sheet in the Construction Plan and accept the risk factor. If 
medium, the Project Manager has the authority to sign it and if the risk is low, the 
superintendent may sign off. Consequently, for the Shaft 10 Significant 
Environmental Aspects, the Project manager takes the role as Risk Acceptance 
Authority and bears the responsibility.   
 
5.3.4 Continuation of the EMS 
Once the procedures are in place and the environmental improvements have been 
made, the system is relied on to prevent significant environmental impacts from the 
site. Although functional, the system needs to be constantly critiqued and 
controlled regularly since it is applied on dynamic, constantly changing settings 
and needs to be flexible47. Projections of future changes of the site and planning to 
ensure that the site meets future requirements are also necessary.   
 
The Safety Engineer at the Shaft 10 site performs controls regularly. The controls 
comprise items that are considered important from an environmental standpoint as 
well as safety checks. A pilot program is carried out on the Delaware Aqueduct 
project in which a Palm Device is used to check the vital items. The information 
can then be seen by anyone with authorization to the program. If the program 
works well, it will be implemented in the whole company. 
 
A major challenge from this stage and forward is to maintain a high degree of 
consciousness of the environmental aspects at every level in the job-site 
organization. The EMS is communicated to employees and subcontractors through 
briefings from the SHEMS, video education and guidelines from Superintendents.  
 
A quick session is carried out if a small and unexpected problem or situation 
emerges throughout the projects life-cycle. During the session, the Safety Engineer 
explains briefly the situation for the work crew and assesses the risks. 
 
5.4 Internal and External Audits 
In order to retain the ISO-14001 certificate, Gottlieb Skanska is required to 
perform both internal and external audits. The procedures of the two audits are 
similar, consisting of a walk-through on the job-site and controls of key processes 
to confirm that they are in compliance with the EMS. The internal audit is done by 
a person from another operating unit and vice versa, to avoid favoritism. 
                                                          
  46 Gottlieb Skanska SHEMS, 2005, p.24 
47 Pers. med., Pappalardo, 2005 
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The external audit is performed by National Sanitation Foundation-International 
Strategic Registration, Ltd (NSF-ISR), a voluntary consensus standards service 
provider. In addition to the walk-through, the external audit includes a more strict 
control of the EMS-documentation.  
 
The projects to audit are picked randomly within Gottlieb Skanska and the focus of 
the audit depends on the processes of the project. After the audit the auditor brings 
the paper to a board at NSF-ISR and receives critique. If the Environmental 
Manager at the job-site later gets corrective action requirements, he/she has seven 
days to resolve a major problem and thirty days to resolve a minor one48.    
 
Audits are executed both at site level and corporate level. The audits are designed 
to keep the target company’s EMS performing well in the long-run. 
  
5.5 Objectives of the EMS 
The management system is designed to make environmental care an integral part 
of all projects undertaken by Gottlieb Skanska and a responsibility of all 
employees. It is meant to allocate appropriate resources and provide the training 
necessary to ensure the attainment of environmental targets.  
 
This broad definition of the EMS is a framework for achieving the following 
results49: 
 
• Regulatory compliance: Evaluate and comply with applicable federal, 
state and local laws and regulations and any other requirement at each 
location where it conducts business. 
 
• Prevention of accidents: Strive to identify and assess risk in all activities 
and take actions to mitigate any high-risk conditions 
 
• Prevention of pollution: Seek first, to cost effectively avoid the creation 
of pollution and waste from projects and operations, and second, to 
manage remaining waste through safe and responsible methods.  
 
• Conservation: Strive to reduce consumption of natural resources through 
cost-effective use of recycled and reused materials and conservation of 
energy and water. 
 
• Emissions and effluents Work to diminish emissions and effluents by 
employing operational controls, monitoring operational indicators  
 
                                                          
  48 Pers. med., Quinn, 2005 
  49 Gottlieb Skanska SHEPS, 2005, p.1 
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• Ecology and habitat: Protect habitats, wetlands and other sensitive 
ecological resources in accordance with applicable regulations and 
ordinances. 
 
• Hazardous and Toxic substances: Exercise caution when using hazardous 
material and avoid the use of toxic substances if we cannot properly 
access their environmental risks. 
 
• Communication: Alert potentially affected individuals and authorities of 
any environmental incidents in a timely and effective manner. 
 
In day-to day operations, compliance with Safety and Environmental legislation 
plays the most significant role of these targets, directing how operations will be 
conducted. The following chapter reviews regulations affecting Gottlieb Skanska’s 
work at the Shaft 10 reconstruction site.  
 
 
6. Regulations 
A great amount of regulations set the framework for Gottlieb Skanska’s operations 
at the West Branch Reservoir. This chapter reviews the regulations mandating 
environmental protection and the restrictions limiting the extent of pollutions and 
emissions. Regulations regarding the water quality of the West Branch reservoir 
and handling of hazardous waste are emphasized, in view of the fact that this 
paper focuses on these environmental issues.  
 
6.1 Regulations concerning water quality 
At the federal level, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) works to develop 
and enforce regulations that implement environmental laws enacted by Congress. 
The enactment   of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
gave EPA the authority to implement water pollution control programs. As 
amended in 1977, this law became commonly known as the Clean Water Act 
(CWA). The Act established the basic structure for regulating discharges of 
pollutants into the waters and is the cornerstone of surface water quality protection 
in the United States50. 
 
EPA mandates to New York City Department of Environmental Protection 
(NYCDEP), how to carry out its regulatory work, which in turn protects the 
quality of the watersheds of New York City Water supply in Westchester, Putnam, 
Dutchess, Delaware, Ulster, Greene, Sullivan and Schoharie counties through the 
Chapter 18: Final Rules and Regulations for the Protection from Contamination, 
Degradation and Pollution of the New York City Water Supply and its Sources51. 
The purpose of these rules is to insure compliance with Federal and State standards 
                                                          
50 www, Dagens Miljö, 2005 
51 NYC Department of Environmnetal Protection, 2005 p.1 
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by providing a comprehensive watershed protection program. Several federal 
regulations, guidance documents and technical materials have been incorporated 
and are occasionally referred to.   
 
Under subchapter C of Chapter 18, Regulated Activities concerning the following 
elements are found that directs Gottlieb Skanska’s work at Shaft 10: 
• Section 18-32 Discharge of Hazardous Substances and Hazardous waste52  
• Section 18-34 Discharge of Petroleum products53  
• Section 18-39 Storm water Pollution Prevention Plans54 
• Section 18-40 Miscellaneous Point Sources55  
• Section 18-41 Solid Waste56  
Subchapter D of Chapter 18, Water Quality Standards for Reservoirs directs the 
standards of quality that has to be met and the levels of material in the water to be 
maintained (see appendix H): 
• Section 18-48 Water Quality Standards57  
6.2 Regulations concerning waste handling 
Waste handling is regulated at the state level by New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation. Chapter 4- Quality Services contains subchapter B: 
Solid Wastes which directs Management of waste. Under Subchapter B: Solid 
Wastes, 5 parts contain elements directing Gottlieb Skanska’s waste handling:  
 
1. Part 360: Solid Waste Management Facilities58 
• Subpart 360-14: Used Oil  
• Subpart 360-15: Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Planning 
2. Part 364: Waste Transporter Permits59 
3. Part 370: Hazardous Waste Management System—General60 
4. Part 371: Identification and Listing of Hazardous Wastes61 
                                                          
  52 NYC Department of Environmnetal Protection, 2005, p.43 
  53 NYC Department of Environmnetal Protection, 2005, p.45 
  54 NYC Department of Environmnetal Protection, 2005, p.66 
  55 NYC Department of Environmnetal Protection, 2005, p.77 
  56 NYC Department of Environmnetal Protection, 2005, p.78 
  57 NYC Department of Environmnetal Protection, 2005, p.82 
  58 www, Department of Environmnetal Conservation, 2005, 1 
  59 www, Department of Environmental Conservation, 2005, 2 
  60 www, Department of Environmental Conservation, 2005, 3 
  61 www, Department of Environmental Conservation, 2005, 4 
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5. Part 374: Management of Specific Hazardous Waste62 
• Subpart 374.1: Standards for the Management of Specific Hazardous 
Wastes and Specific Types of Hazardous Waste Management Facilities 
• Subpart 374.2: Standards for the Management of Used Oil 
• Subpart 374.3: Standards For Universal Wastes 
 
These parts all give directions for storing, transportation and management of non-
hazardous and hazardous waste generated at the Shaft 10 reconstruction site. 
Skanska has so far met or exceeded all regulations for the Delaware Aqueduct 
contract. Regarding PCB and Mercury, the most harmful of the hazardous wastes 
from the construction site, these regulations give a zero-tolerance level of 
discharges, which implies that no PCB or Mercury may end up in the environment.  
 
 
7. Theoretical framework  
Based on literature and articles, this chapter reviews the concept of Risk Analysis 
in an industrial context. Many of the examined techniques are originally designed 
for use in the process industries and are intended to deal with health and safety 
hazards. Even so, these techniques may be modified to also apply to environmental 
aspects in the construction industry. Only the methods most relevant to the Shaft 
10 construction site are objects to in-depth review, while others are briefly 
mentioned to point out alternative approaches to risk assessment.   
 
7.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
The use of QRA is one of many tools to assist with decision-making on the design 
of predictive and preventive systems. When QRA is used within a company, the 
applications frequently involve the comparison of alternatives. In the case of 
planning preventive systems, the comparison may be between alternative locations 
for the arrangements. In other cases the comparison may be between alternative 
processes, the way in which hazardous materials are stored or alternative degrees 
of commitment63. A general procedure to perform risk assessment is shown in 
chart 3.  
 
 
                                                          
  62 www, Department of Environmental Conservation, 2005, 5 
63 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.88 
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    Chart 3: Procedure for the application of risk assessment  
                       (source: Risk Assessment in process industries, p.5) 
 
 
The analysis sets out to answer three questions64:  
 
• What can go wrong? 
• What are the consequences and effects and are these acceptable? 
• Are the safeguards and controls adequate to render the risk acceptable? 
 
through the deployment of four basic QRA-stages65: 
  
• The identification of the potential hazard 
• The estimation of the consequences of each hazard 
• The estimation of the probability of occurrence of each hazard 
                                                          
  64 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.4 
  65 Andrews & Moss, 1993, p. 13 
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No 
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• A comparison of the results of the analysis against the acceptability 
criteria. 
  
The benefits of quantitative hazard analysis arise in two direct ways and a third 
indirect way. For analyses carried out during planning, like the one at Shaft 10, 
modifications found to be needed during the analysis allow changes to be made on 
paper, when they are cheap. After the job-site is raised, benefits are largely from 
reductions in accidents. The benefits are extended indirectly if the process of 
analysis increases hazard awareness and communication. Additionally it gives the 
safety engineer at the site a “hard science” basis for their work, which may 
increase their effectiveness66.  
 
Many companies, among them Gottlieb Skanska, do not use quantitative 
techniques after the identification stage. Decisions are made and actions taken to 
control specific hazards, and they are done considering probabilities and 
consequences qualitatively. In a sense, this is an elementary form of risk analysis, 
but on a less sophisticated level67  
 
7.1.1 Identification of potential hazards and their consequences  
Since no single identification method can be recommended for all circumstances, a 
company assessing operations-related hazards should seek to select a method to 
suit both the needs of the process and the experience of the company68. 
 
It is often beneficial to carry out the identification in stages matched to the quality 
of information available, given that the flexibility to eliminate hazards entirely is 
much reduced by the time the design is sufficiently documented to allow a full 
hazard study. Although hazard identification is normally given most attention at 
the design stage of a project, the importance of continuing the identification 
throughout the life of the project must be emphasized, particularly when 
modifications are made69. 
 
The techniques discussed in this section are aimed at two particular outcomes. 
First, there is the identification of serious incidents, known as “top events” and 
second, the methods can be used to identify the underlying root causes which can 
lead to the top events, as well as those incidents which could lead to operability 
problems.  
 
The techniques most frequently used to identify hazards in the design stage can be 
grouped as follows70:  
 
 
                                                          
66 Taylor & Spon, 1994, p.19 
67 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.5 
68 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.9 
69 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.10 
70 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.12 
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Basic techniques 
• Hazard and Operability Method (Hazop)  
• What-if Analysis 
• Knowledge based Hazop 
• Check-lists 
• Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
 
The Hazop method is of greatest interest because it is the most advanced method 
applicable on the Shaft10 construction site. This technique comprises examination 
and recording of hazards and may serve as thorough assessments of potentially 
mal-functioning items71. 
 
7.1.1.1 Hazard and Operability Method (Hazop) 
The Hazop method was developed by ICI and is the most widely used technique 
for identifying hazards. It is a structured qualitative way of defining potential 
hazards. The basic concept of a Hazop study is to identify hazards which may arise 
within a specific system or as a result of system interactions with other processes. 
It consists of a rigorous examination of all possible variations of operating 
conditions on each item of a process through the use of specific terms and “guide 
words”72. Table 3 describes the most commonly used terms in Hazop analysis.  
 
 Table 3: Hazop terminology (source: Reliability and risk assessment, p.54) 
GUIDE WORD EXPLANATION 
INTENTION Defines how the part is expected to function 
DEVIATIONS Departures from design intention 
CAUSES Reasons why the deviations might occur.  
CONSEQUENCES Results of the deviations 
HAZARDS Consequences which can cause damage, 
pollution or loss 
GUIDE WORDS Words used to qualify the intention and 
hence deviations 
No/Not No flow, pressure etc 
More High flow, pressure etc 
Less Low flow, low pressure etc 
As well as Material in addition to the normal process 
fluids 
Part of A component is missing from the process 
fluid 
Reverse Reverse flow of process fluids 
                       
 
                                                          
  71 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.13 
  72 Andrews & Moss, 1993, p. 54 
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Throughout the study, the Hazop terms are used in record sheets for each item of 
interest.  The record sheets may describe appropriate actions to secure the process 
and are subsequently used as foundation for further analysis73. 
 
Both procedures 1A and 1B of the Gottlieb Skanska EMS show certain Hazop 
characteristics (see chapters 7.3.1 and 7.3.2), though it is standardized for 
application on many different types of construction projects and thus not detailed 
enough to take all processes into account.  
 
7.1.2 Estimation of event probability and consequence analysis 
This part discusses techniques used to estimate event probabilities and the 
combination of these event probabilities with the result of consequence analysis to 
produce estimates of the overall risk from an activity.  
 
The most common definition of risk is likelihood times severity, used in the 
SHEMS Risk Matrix for instance. Risk or soft uncertainty is also used to define 
situations where 1) the set of all possible outcomes of an action is known and 2) 
the probability distributions of all possible outcomes is also known. Hard 
uncertainty is used to define situations where either 1) the set of all possible 
outcomes or future states is unknown or 2) where the full set of outcomes is 
known, but the probability distributions of all possible outcomes of the action is 
unknown or is not fully definable for a lack of reliable information74. The 
uncertainty about pollution from Shaft 10 will henceforth be defined as soft 
uncertainty, although the criteria are barely fulfilled.  
 
There are two basic approaches to event probability estimation. The first is direct 
use of statistical data on failure of systems. This is sometimes called the “historical 
approach”. The second is to break down the event into its contributory factors and 
causes, using analytical/ simulation techniques. An advantage associated with the 
use of historical event data is that, where the accumulated experience is relevant 
and statistically meaningful, the assessment will not omit any of the significant 
routes leading to the event. However, outdated data which may not be relevant to a 
specific case under study are also included, resulting in an over-estimate, usually 
referred to as a conservative estimate75 of the chance of the event.  
 
Careful definition of the events to be quantified is important when using analytical 
simulation techniques, especially in a full analysis where the probabilities and 
consequences of the various possible events are to be combined to produce an 
overall quantitative estimate76.  
 
                                                          
73 Andrews & Moss, 1993, p.56 
74 Richard, 2001, p.42 
75 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.65 
76 Taylor & Spon, 1994, p.19 
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The techniques most frequently used to estimate event probabilities can be grouped 
as follows77:   
 
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
• Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
• Task Analysis  
 
These techniques all model the mechanisms, the logical combinations or sequence 
of events, by which an undesired event could occur. Most of the techniques are 
constructed as logic diagrams and are initially qualitative in nature, although they 
provide models for subsequent quantification if considered appropriate. Hazop and 
FMEA methods (see chapter 9.1.1.1 and 9.1.1.2) do not provide the logic 
framework for setting down full event causes and effects which characterize logic 
diagram trees approaches. However, logic diagrams must start from an event 
which has been identified by some of those methods78. 
 
The FTA is of greatest interest in this study because it can be used as cause-
consequence analyses for an enhanced assessment of risks at the Shaft 10 
construction site.  
 
7.1.2.1 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis is the best known and most widely used technique for 
developing failure logic. The basic process is to select an undesired “top-event” 
and trace it back to the possible causes which can be component failures, human 
errors or any other pertinent events that can lead to the top event. The fault tree 
only includes events which contribute to its top event; it is not a model of all 
possible system failures. 
 
A fault tree is composed of a complex of entities known as “gates” which produce 
a specified output which is propagated. The most common “gates” are represented 
in table 4. The gates represent logical expressions with corresponding algebraic 
functions applied in the numerical modeling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.12 
78 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.68 
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                 Table 4: Fault Tree Symbols (source: Risk Analysis for Process plant,  
              pipelines, and transport, p.78)  
 
 
 
 
 
                                     
An important qualitative use of Fault Trees is “minimal cut set analysis”. This is a 
technique which first identifies all possible combinations of events that can lead to 
the top event. The list is then sorted into order based on the number of events in 
each cut set. Highest review priority is then assigned to low numbers, as these 
imply less safeguarding and hence greater risk79.  
 
Although in many cases there is no need to use probability mathematics, an 
advantage of such techniques is the ability to carry out sensitivity analysis, with 
input data as statistical distributions.  
 
For large systems, Fault Trees often get very complex and are sometimes hard to 
analyze. If the system in addition is dynamic, i.e. changing state during its lifetime, 
special procedures need to be deployed. Different approaches have been tested in 
these situations, which all incorporate a degree of ignorance of incompatible states 
of components at certain stages of the analysis.  
 
 
 
                                                          
79 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.68 
 
 
 
Intermediate Event, resulting from a 
combination of other events or conditions 
  
Basic Fault Event 
  
AND gate. All inputs must occur in order for the 
output event to occur 
  
OR gate. The output event occurs if any of the 
input events occur 
  
Secondary failure events or causes, not 
investigated in detail 
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7.2 Simulation of possible events 
Once the Fault Tree model has been properly constructed, a subsequent step could 
be to use stochastic simulation to show different scenarios involving the events 
embedded in those models which affect the top event of the tree (the objective 
function). This is done to assimilate the various uncertainties of the problem and 
produce a realistic appreciation of the problem’s total uncertainty80. As an 
extension of the Fault and Event Tree Analyses, deployment of Monte Carlo 
simulation fits well in the QRA-context.  
 
The use of Monte Carlo Simulation is the most viable option in many dynamic 
problems as it is easy to apply on real-world situations and provides results that are 
useful in decision-making. Monte Carlo simulation offers the most versatile of all 
the system analysis methods available. Independence of component failure and 
constant failure rates, assumptions required for most analytic methods, are not 
required for simulation. Systems can thus be modeled in whatever level of detail 
required81.  
 
The basic approach to Monte Carlo simulation is to transform the single point 
values (“best guess estimates”) describing uncertain events in a deterministic 
model into distributions. The uncertainties in these estimates mean that they can be 
treated as random variables, which in turn can be described by a probability 
distribution with a probability density function (PDF).  
 
A probability distribution is a plot of the probability density (i.e. relative 
frequency) versus the data variables to describe the behaviour of a random 
variable82. The PDF can also be represented by its Cumulative Distribution 
Function, (CDF). The CDF is obtained by adding (accumulating) the individual 
increments of the probability distribution function. As will be shown, the 
cumulative density function is defined as the probability that any outcome in X is 
less than or equal to a stated limiting value x. The PDF is the slope of the CDF. 
The CDF is very useful when depicting and comparing risks.  
 
For clarification, the Monte Carlo approximation works in the following way83: 
 
 
 
Suppose a known model is given:    Y=F(X)     Y=Output 
                                                                                          X=Input 
    
along with a probability distribution function F, where ( ) ( )axaF ≤= Pr  for the 
value of the input x.  
 
                                                          
  80 Vose, 1996, p.1 
  81 Andrews & Moss, 1993, p.260 
  82 McBean & Frank, 1998, p.18 
  83 Cox, 2002, p.80 
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The probability distribution of y can be approximated by (a) Randomly drawing 
multiple values of x from F, (b) Calculating ( )ii xfy =  for each sampled input 
value ix ; and (c) Forming the sample distribution function of the resulting 
iy values.  
 
This sample distribution approximates the true probability distribution of y induced 
by the probability distribution of x. During simulation performed by software 
packages, this sampling method is run over and over again, each time with a 
random number between 0 and 1 to generate a random sample for the probability 
distribution84. 
 
Through the use of Monte Carlo simulation, the distribution of the top event 
probability in terms of the individual parameters distributions may thus be 
determined85, which provides a good explanatory ground for sensitivity analysis 
and comparison of risks. 
 
7.4 Tolerability and acceptability of risk 
The above analysis, if mannered correctly and applied in an accurate way, provides 
a comprehensive quantitative risk assessment. The degree of “completeness” of the 
analysis always varies from project to project depending on the complexity of the 
project, availability of significant data, costs and the types of uncertainty and 
consequences faced by the decision-maker.  
 
When the uncertain situation is fully replicated, given the constraints mentioned 
above, the following step is to make the decision regarding acceptance of the 
risk/risks. Although the QRA is an important factor in decision-making, the 
acceptance of an activity should not be based on risk alone86. Sound decisions are 
unlikely to be reached if no consideration is given to the uncertainty in the risk 
estimates, the costs of reducing the risks, other costs to the organization or society 
of the activity or the benefits to be derived from it.  
 
The choice of accepting or not accepting the risk/risks may be facilitated by the 
definition and deployment of certain criteria. Three classes of concepts can be 
defined and are depicted in chart 387: 
 
• an “intolerable” level of risk at or above which immediate action to 
reduce the risk or terminate the activity is called for, irrespective of cost 
• a “broadly acceptable” level at or below which further reduction measures 
are nor required 
• a middle region where additional risk reduction measures are necessary 
until their overall cost becomes grossly disproportionate to the risk 
                                                          
84 Vose, 1996, p.40 
85 Andrews & Moss, 1993, p.260 
86 Pitblado & Turney, 1996,  p.91 
87 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p. 91 
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reduction produced. This is classed as “as low as reasonable practicable” 
(ALARP)  
 
The higher and more unacceptable a risk is, the more proportionately one is to 
spend to reduce it. This implies a considerable effort even to achieve a marginal 
reduction. There may come a point where even a marginal further reduction would 
be unjustifiably expensive and the obligation to improve is discharged88. 
 
Where the risks are less significant, the less proportionately it is worth spending to 
reduce the risk. At the lower limit where the risks are ”broadly acceptable” the 
levels of risk are so insignificant that further reduction is not necessary, provided 
that the risk levels will be attained in practice89.  
 
ALARP implies that, in making a judgment, the total cost and inconvenience 
associated with risk reduction measure may be weighed against the benefits of 
reduced risk.  
 
 
 
 
Once a risk is found to be in the ALARP region, cost-benefit analysis may be used 
as an aid to decision making. In the simplest case, the total cost of the measures 
                                                          
  88 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.92 
  89 Pitblado & Turney, 1996, p.93 
The ALARP region 
(risk is undertaken 
only if a benefit is 
desired)
Intolerable region 
Risk cannot be 
justified on 
any grounds 
Broadly acceptable region 
Intolerable 
level 
Tolerable only if 
risk reduction is 
impracticable or if 
cost is grossly 
disproportionate to 
the improvement 
gained 
Tolerable if cost of 
reduction would exceed the 
improvement gained 
Chart 4: Level of risk and ALARP (source: Risk Assessment in Process Industries, p.92) 
Negligible risk 
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necessary to reduce the risk may be set against the achieved risk reduction and 
decisions made on the best option to adopt.  
 
7.5 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
A CBA summarizes the positive and negative aspects of an alternative into one 
number. A CBA will shed much light on four central features of an environmental 
project: (1) the efficient level of protection that balances the benefits and costs of 
additional protection; (2) the optimal mix of environmental features in the 
alternative; (3) the optimal size or scale of the project; (4) the optimal timing of 
when to implement the components of the management action90.  
 
An important element is establishing what the baseline, or effects without the 
policy, would be. The effects of the policy are then compared to a future state of 
the world without the policy to establish the net effect of the policy, which avoids 
using a “before vs. after” viewpoint, which may attribute some changes that occur 
at the same time as the policy implementation to the project, when in fact the 
changes were already underway91.  
 
Defining the benefits and determining in which way these benefits are to be valued 
are other crucial but difficult tasks. Monetizing environmental safety and progress 
is often considered controversial, as we are unfamiliar thinking of these issues in 
market terms. However, not including them in a CBA will lead to a distorted 
answer in the analysis92.  
 
In addition to carefully define and monetize the benefits and costs, discounting 
these items over time is necessary for an analysis. This is due to the simple fact 
that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow, as people prefer their 
benefits now rather than later. People might also invest their money in some 
productive enterprise to yield a net return93.  
 
A common means used to discount future streams of benefits and cost is the Net 
Present Value (NPV). As the name implies, NPV is the present value of the 
benefits minus the present value of the costs. The difference is the net gain 
adjusted for the timing of benefits and costs. The units of measurement are present 
worth of dollars in the base year in which all of the benefits and costs are figured. 
The definition of NPV can be illustrated by the equation94    
 
( )∑= +
−=
T
t
tr
CtBtNPV
0 1
 
where:  
                                                          
90 Loomis & Helfand, 2001, p.105 
91 Loomis & Helfand , p.107 
92 Loomis & Helfand, p.109 
93 Loomis & Helfand, p.141 
94 Loomis & Helfand, p.151 
 34 
Bt = Benefits in time period t 
Ct = Costs in time period t 
r = interest rate 
t = time period 
 
If NPV is used as a decision rule, then only projects with NPV greater than zero 
are accepted as economically efficient. NPV might be seen as a discounted 
measure of whether the environmental management action represents a potential 
Pareto improvement over the life of the project, which indicates a situation where 
nobody loses from a policy, and at least some gain.  
 
8. Application of the theory 
The previous chapters 6, 7, and 8 review the construction operations, the 
implementation of the EMS and regulations directing the work, while Chapter 9 
describes QRA-theory. This part seeks to relate the contents of the preceding 
chapters to each other, providing an application of the theory on the on-going 
operations of Shaft 10. The objective is to demonstrate a more quantitative Risk 
Analysis as an alternative to Gottlieb Skanska’s Risk Assessment and to prove its 
robustness using data collected through surveys and by reviewing SHEMS 
templates and environmental monitoring data from previous similar Gottlieb 
Skanska projects. The numerical data are used in models in Microsoft Excel and its 
add-in @Risk.   
 
The analysis follows as close as possible the steps described in chapter 9, although 
some deviations occur, caused by limited amount of data and other inconsistencies 
between theory and practical implementation. The major elements of 
environmental assessment include a review of existing information, initial site 
visit, and a review of potential assessment methods, assessment design, data 
analysis, risk assessment and remediation95. 
 
The general approach is to carry out a QRA-analysis for possible contamination of 
the water in the West Branch Reservoir. Firstly, the analysis takes no account of 
Gottlieb Skanska’s measures and controls to protect the water. Secondly, those 
results get compared with the results from an exact same analysis but now 
considering the controls implemented at the site. The first results function as the 
“base-line case” without controls, which in comparison with the second 
“implemented policy case” with controls provides a foundation for Cost-Benefit 
Analysis. The two analyses differ from each other only in the simulation stage, 
where the reduction of likelihood of the various events gets accounted for.  
A Hazop Analysis identifies potential sources of contaminants in the reservoir 
from Shaft 10 and their consequences, which is used as support for the Fault Tree 
Analysis. The Fault Tree Analysis is constructed based on the Hazop and 
information about cause-consequence relationships in between activities at the 
construction site and environmental impact.  
                                                          
  95 Louvar & Louvar, 1998, p.285 
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To simulate various scenarios of possible events that could cause discharges to the 
West Branch reservoir, a model is constructed in the Microsoft Excel add-in 
@Risk. Probability distributions are assigned to the uncertain components of the 
model, which were defined in the Hazop and Fault Tree Analyses96. The 
probability distributions describe the amount of discharges from the 
activities/events while the severity of the discharge is captured through an impact 
factor ranging from 1-10 for the activities/events, which is multiplied with the 
probability distributions97. The following text reviews special features of the 
model, its constraints and assumptions about the variables. 
 
Data about leakage of Asbestos materials where gathered from old environmental 
audits. Information about probability of leakage from machines, workers handling 
substances, soil erosion and solid materials come from surveys directed to the 
workers and the safety engineer at the construction site. The model thus involves 
elements of subjective estimation due to lack of relevant historical data. Error and 
bias problems are addressed through the forming of the surveys and the choice of 
probability distributions used to model the potential environmental problems.  
 
In general, non-parametric/general distributions are better for modeling subjective 
expert opinion than parametric/theoretically derived distributions. The distinction 
between the two groups of distributions may be expressed as follows. The shape of 
theoretically derived distributions is borne of the mathematics describing a 
theoretical problem while general distributions’ mathematics are defined by the 
shape that is required. The two distributions used in this model are the Trigen 
distribution for the variables with data from surveys and the General distribution 
for Asbestos variable, with data from old environmental audits. Both these 
distributions are general and intuitively easy to understand98.  
 
The Trigen distribution is an extension of the Triang distribution and requires 5 
parameters: a) the practical minimum, b) the most likely value, c) the practical 
maximum value, d) the probability that the value could be below a, e) the 
probability that the value could be below c. d) and e) are set to 0 and 90 
respectively. This distribution is useful when it is fairly easy to estimate the 
minimum and most likely values of a variable, but the maximum is almost 
unbounded and could be enormous99.   
 
The distributions also need to be constrained to fit the reality of Shaft 10. There 
can for instance not be a positive environmental impact from Shaft 10, a fact which 
is expressed through truncation of all the variable’s probability distributions so 
their minimum value is 0.  All variables have continuous distributions and may 
take several values within a range determined by the information from the surveys. 
The range represents the amount of discharges for the whole period of 
                                                          
96 Vose, 1996, p.190 
97 Pers. Med., Official NYCDEP 
98 Vose, 1996, p.56 
99 Vose, 1996, p.168 
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reconstruction, which is 75 months. Correlations between the different variables 
might be observed for three reasons. The first is that there is a logical relationship 
between the variables. The second is that there is another external factor affecting 
both variables. The third reason is that the observed correlation has occurred 
purely by chance and no correlation actually exists100. For this analysis, a 
correlation matrix is used to correlate the probability distributions of leakage and 
erosion together because the activity of the machines at the site affects both 
probabilities.  
 
To account for the reduction of risk of discharges to the watershed, estimates 
gathered through surveys are used. The controls are estimated to decrease the 
discharges with 50% for leakage from machines, 40% for manual spill, 75% for 
solid materials and soil erosion and 90% for spillage of hazardous waste. The 
probability that the value could be below the practical maximum of the distribution 
is raised to 95101. 
 
The most important outputs of the two simulations are 1) general statistics for each 
variable that may be used for comparison of the “base-case” and “implemented 
policy case”, 2) Tornado graphs depicting the dependency of the overall 
environmental impact on the risky activities for the two cases, and 3) Cumulative 
Distribution Functions (CDFs) for each variable.  
 
The CDF graphs are very useful when comparing risks, as they picture the 
uncertainty of a given situation, are comparable and intuitively easy to understand. 
The CDF is S-shaped for a typical bell-shaped Probability Distribution Function 
(PDF)102. In this analysis, the graphic depiction of the CDFs for the activities has 
cumulative probability on the vertical axis and amount of discharges on the 
horizontal axis, while the CDF for overall environmental impact incorporates 
severity of the various discharges on the horizontal axis as well. Probabilities for 
particular intervals can be extracted from the curve by reading off fractile values. 
A fractile is that value of the uncertain variable for which the probability that the 
variable is smaller than the fractile is the fractile103. In other words, a cumulative 
probability on the vertical axis matching a point on the curve is the probability that 
the variable takes on values below the point on the curve. The variance of the 
uncertain variable is represented by the slope of the curve. A steeper slope 
represents less variance of the variable. Also, the farther to the right the curve is, 
the greater amount of discharges is covered by the cumulative probability.  
 
 
9. Results  
                                                          
  100 Vose, 1996, p.192 
  101 Survey seven construction workers and safety engineer, 2005 
  102 Hardacker et al., 2002, p.39 
  103 Hardacker et al., 2002, p.41 
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This chapter reviews the results from the environmental QRA. Brief comments 
about the results are included, whereas a more thorough analysis is presented in 
next chapter.  
 
9.1 The “base-line case” 
Subsequent to the Hazop and Fault Tree Analyses (see appendices I and J) the 
simulation of the “base-line case”, without considering controls, yielded statistics 
shown in table 5. The unit in table 5 and table 6 is an artificial measurement based 
on the probability of each type of discharge times the consequence of that 
discharge. The overall impact to the reservoir is a summation of each discharge’s 
figure, which comprise all probability distributions times their consequence into 
one number, specific for this job site and comparable only with results from the 
same model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Statistics from simulation, no controls considered (source: @Risk model) 
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To depict how much each of the variables affects the overall impact to the 
reservoir, the top event, a Tornado graph is constructed (chart 4). The Tornado 
graph is a visual representation of a regression with the overall impact as 
dependent variable and the various events as independent variables. Each activity’s 
bar and attached number describes its contribution to the overall impact to the 
reservoir.  
 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean St dev Variance 
Dependent 
variable 
     
Overall 
impact to the 
reservoir 
315.84 67.13 534.54 78.50 6162.19 
Independent 
variables 
     
Excavator 
breakage 
 
0.25 
 
27.55 
 
11.13 
 
5.91 
 
34.93 
Truck 
breakage 
0.20  
34.38 
 
14.02 
 
7.31 
 
53.48 
Car breakage 0.02 6.98 2.70 1.57 2.48 
Drill breakage 0.16  
20.45 
 
8.66 
 
4.36 
 
19.04 
Crane 
breakage 
   
0.05 
 
27.84 
 
10.32 
 
6.38 
 
40.75 
Spill workers 0.51 39.88 18.37 8.28 68.58 
Wood 1.16 133.07 61.79 27.56 759,80 
Metal 0.19 53.83 23.06 11.45 131.09 
Bricks 0.19 40.82 17.14 8.89 79.07 
Miscellan 0.28 26.81 11.72 5.73 32.90 
PCB 0.03 14.31 5.12 3.28 10.79 
Mercury 0.05 14.26 5.20 3.31 10.99 
Lead 0.09 27.62 11.03 6.07 36.88 
Asbestos 1.00 8.06 3.36 1.68 2.82 
Erosion Cars 0.56 105.65 49.37 21.82 476.52 
Erosion Exc 2.32 270.31 117.15 57.25 3278.40 
Erosion Tru 0.97 202.50 87.98 43.28 1873.70 
Erosion Cra 1.01 94.34 41.63 19.73 389.40 
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        Chart 5: Tornado graph without controls (source: @Risk Model) 
 
 
9.2 The “Implemented policy case” 
The simulation of the “implemented policy case”, considering controls, yielded 
statistics shown in table 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
 Bricks/C17  ,055
 Cars/C7  ,056
 Metal/C16  ,074
 Lead/C23  ,076
 EroCrane/C30  ,122
 EroCars/C27  ,134
 Drill/C5  ,169
 Wood/C15  ,172
 Excavator/C6  ,23
 Crane/C9  ,241
 Trucks/C8  ,276
 EroTrucks/C29  ,278
 Workers/C12  ,312
 EroExca/C28  ,378
 Mercury/C22  ,402
 PCB/C21  ,411
@RISK Student Version
For Academic Use Only
-1 -0,75 -0,5 -0,25 0 0,25 0,5 0,75 1
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Table 6: Statistics from simulation, controls considered (source: @Risk Model) 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean St dev Variance 
Dependent 
variable 
     
Overall risk 87.80 265.85 175.34 26.70 713.02 
Independent 
variables 
     
Excavator 
breakage 
0.16 11.92 5.11 2.59 6.71 
Truck 
breakage 
0.04 15.03 6.41 3.27 10.68 
Car breakage 0.05 2.97 1.23 0.68 0.46 
Drill breakage 0.18 8.99 3.97 1.89 3.58 
Crane 
breakage 
0.18 12.24 4.80 2.88 8.27 
Spill workers 0.99 20.72 10.73 4.55 20.71 
Wood 0.64 29.59 14.44 6.39 40.79 
Metal 0.15 11.68 5.35 2.54 6.45 
Bricks 0.33 9.05 3.72 1.88 3.55 
Miscellan 0.12 5.87 2.76 1.20 1.43 
PCB 0.02 1.21 0.46 0.29 0.08 
Mercury 0.01 1.19 0.45 0.28 0.08 
Lead 0.02 2.44 1.01 0.55 0.30 
Asbestos 1.01 7.64 3.43 1.62 2.61 
Erosion Cars 0.45 23.38 11.35 4.83 23.33 
Erosion Exc 0.49 60.01 26.65 12.79 163.62 
Erosion Tru 1.77 44.75 19.30 9.29 86.25 
Erosion Cra 0.37 20.61 10.14 4.44 19.72 
           
 
A Tornado graph is constructed considering controls, which in comparison with 
chart 4 clearly shows how the weights of the independent variables change with 
and without controls.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
 Bricks/C17  ,038
 Metal/C16  ,051
 Cars/C7  ,082
 EroCrane/C30  ,089
 EroCars/C27  ,097
 Mercury/C22  ,114
 PCB/C21  ,116
 Wood/C15  ,129
 EroTrucks/C29  ,187
 Drill/C5  ,229
 EroExca/C28  ,258
 Excavator/C6  ,313
 Crane/C9  ,348
 Asbestos/C24  ,391
 Trucks/C8  ,395
 Workers/C12  ,55
@RISK Student Version
For Academic Use Only
-1 -0,75 -0,5 -0,25 0 0,25 0,5 0,75 1
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         Chart 6: Tornado graph with controls (source: @Risk Model) 
 
9.3 In-depth assessment of the environmental risk 
To properly compare the environmental risks of the defined events and the overall 
environmental risk, CDF graphs are used. The CDF graph for the dependent 
overall environmental impact is shown here while the CDF graphs for the 
independent activities are shown in appendix K (see appendix K). The resulting 
CDF from both simulations are shown in the same graph in chart 6 to facilitate 
comparison.  
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               Chart 7: CDF-curves for overall environmental impact (source: @Risk Model) 
 
 
9.4 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The intention of this section is to compare the benefits of the EMS to the costs of 
implementing the EMS for Skanska. Although there conceptually are few obstacles 
in applying the theory of Chapter 9.5, lack of information about both costs and 
benefits makes any form of relevant analysis difficult to make.  
 
An obvious problem is that there exists no concrete value in monetary terms of the 
benefits. Such benefits include: enhanced company image; which attracts 
investors, customers and business partners and lower probability of fines and 
lawsuits. The EMS also works as a quality mark which facilitates interactions with 
interest groups such as communities affected by Gottlieb Skanska projects and 
landowners.  
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10. Analysis  
In this chapter analyses of the results are presented. A comparative analysis of the 
states with and without controls is presented. Comparing the effects of the different 
regimes is more justified if the results all come from the same model, which it does 
in this analysis. All models have some error in them and comparisons are better if 
the form of error is constant across the results104. 
 
10.1 Comparison of the results with and without controls 
The diagrams in Appendix 11 clearly depict that the controls have a tremendous 
impact on the risk of pollution from activities at Shaft 10 to the West Branch 
reservoir. The CDFs considering controls all show a smaller range of kilogram 
discharges and a smaller variance. Hence, the probability of discharges decreases 
for all activities. Using a 50/50 approach, a certain amount of each type of 
pollution for which there is a 50% probability of lower discharges are shown in 
table 7 with and without the controls. The 50/50 concept is good to use since it is 
easier to understand a 50% chance than a 40% or 60% chance for example. The 
figures in table 7 can also be extracted from the CDF-graphs by drawing a line 
from the middle of the cumulative probability axis and see where it crosses the S-
shaped CDF-curve.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Comparison of cumulative probabilities (source: @Risk model) 
                                                          
  104 Loomis & Helfand, p.69 
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The shapes of the CDFs are similar within the groups Spillage machines and 
workers, solid materials, hazardous waste and soil erosion. These similarities are 
due to similar characteristics within the group regarding the amounts of releases.  
 
Regarding the relative effect of the releases on the total environmental impact, 
chart 4 and 5 illustrate the change before and after the controls. This change 
foremost reflects the effectiveness of the controls. The most significant changes 
are the decrease of importance of discharges of PCB and Mercury due to rigorous 
waste control, the disappeared effect from lead paint for the same reason, and the 
ending or decreasing impact of soil erosion from the excavator and trucks, much 
thanks to the Gabion wall control.  
 
The greatest threats to the water of West Branch Reservoir after the controls are 
implemented seem to be spillage, mostly from workers and trucks. Manual spill 
will be the sole greatest contributor to discharges, which makes sense, since 
humans are far more flexible than vehicles and other machines and more easy slip 
through controls preventive systems.  
 
The overall risk of environmental impact changes dramatically after the controls 
are implemented. The horizontal axis of chart 6 is not amount in kilograms, but a 
measurement of all the individual releases multiplied with their severity factor and 
added up. It is an artificial constructed unit which facilitates the comparison of the 
total effect of the controls. The “with controls”- function does not reach 0 which 
implies that some impact is inevitable, but it does not clarify what type of impact. 
As long as the activities of the construction site do not raise the levels of regulated 
Discharges 50% without controls 50% with controls 
Kg Spill from Excavator 12 5 
Kg spill from Trucks 14 6 
Kg spill from Cars 2,7 1,5 
Kg spill from Drill 6,8 2,7 
Kg spill from Crane 7,9 3,5 
Kg spill from  workers 16 10 
Kg Wood 60 12 
Kg Metal 22 5 
Kg bricks 14 3 
Kg Miscellaneous 11 3 
Kg PCB 4,5 0,2 
Kg Mercury 4,5 0,2 
Kg Leaded paint 10 0,7 
Kg Asbestos material 3 0,025 
Kg Soil Erosion Cars 50 10 
Kg Soil Erosion Excavat 120 25 
Kg Soil Erosion Trucks 90 18 
Kg Soil Erosion Crane 38 10 
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substances in the water, which is controlled for by the balloon instruments, some 
discharges are allowed. The range of the CDF is shifted backwards and the slope 
decreases after the controls are implemented, showing a more environmental sound 
situation with the controls.  
 
10.2 Comparison of the SHEMS risk assessment and the QRA 
The QRA represents a more in-depth and detailed assessment of the environmental 
risk. It also involves hard numbers in contrast to the SHEMS assessment. The two 
analyses still have similarities and reach equal results, where the QRA supports the 
qualitative approach. The similarity of the results might be related to two things; 
the estimates of discharges come from the same people that stand behind the 
SHEMS, or the actual qualitative analysis is well performed. The form of the 
surveys and the distributions for the simulation allows for estimation of the 
independent variables, which helps replicating the situation at the Shaft 10 
throughout the 75 month project.  
 
Examples of similarities in between SHEMS and QRA is the great effect from 
worker spill on the water after controls are implemented shown in the Tornado 
graph (see chart 6) and a stated emphasis on EMS training and education 
throughout the project. The management acknowledges that the worker spill is a 
great source of pollution after the preventive controls.  
 
For environmental management projects, decision makers may currently receive 
four types of technical input: modelling/monitoring, risk analysis, cost or cost-
benefit analysis and stakeholder preferences. While modelling and monitoring 
results are usually presented as quantitative estimates, risk assessment and cost-
benefit analysis incorporate a higher degree of qualitative judgment by team 
members and experts105.  
 
In contrast to the SHEMS assessment, the QRA is restricted to analysis of impact 
on the watershed. Protection of the water is the most important issue in the 
SHEMS to, because of the nature of the project, but the analysis is not limited to 
those risks.  
 
10.3 Tolerability of risk and CBA 
Although a full analysis can not be formulated, some general points relating the 
theory to this real-life situation need to be made.  
 
Before the controls, most of the defined activities/threats are in the intolerable 
region. In this region, a Cost-Benefit Analysis is not necessary, as the risks need to 
be reduced at any cost.  
 
Bricks, metal and leakage from cars are in the upper ALARP region, and for these 
activities/threats a Cost-Benefit Analysis would be justified if the controls where 
                                                          
  105 Linkov & Bamadan, 2004, p.57 
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aimed only at these variables. Now this is not the case, the controls are installed to 
prevent general discharges or leakage. For example, the silt fence reduces the risk 
of any solid material reaching the watershed, not only metal.  
 
When the controls have been implemented, further preventive measures’ costs are 
disproportional to the benefits of reducing the risks even more, and all defined 
activities/threats are in the ALARP region. The residual risk is bearable and 
accepted. 
 
A CBA would require knowledge of benefits of the risk reduction, which is 
difficult to quantify.  
 
 
11. Conclusions  
The main objective of this study is to present an alternative way of assessing 
environmental risks in the construction industry. The activity at the Shaft 10 
construction site is used as example, on which the methodology is applied. Since 
QRA provides an assessment of environmental safety, and safety in turn is highly 
dependent on environmental management, the link between QRA and 
environmental management is important. 
 
In comparison with the present risk assessment, the QRA results do not deviate 
much from the present outcomes, although the QRA in more detail addresses 
environmental threats. The advantages of a quantitative analysis might be more 
evident if it was applied on more complex projects than the Shaft 10 remediation 
and if data about releases and their consequences where attainable. The context in 
which this project was undertaken didn’t allow much use of historical data from 
previous similar construction projects, which forced the risk analysis to be based 
mostly on assumptions. The use of assumptions from the same persons who carried 
out the original Risk Assessment results, not surprisingly, in similar outcomes.  
 
Nevertheless, the strength of this probabilistic approach is in using available data 
to determine whether conclusions can be drawn. Generic data is combined with 
sound expert judgment to attain the most realistic model possible. The assumptions 
in the models can to a large degree be justified from the employee’s experiences, 
which make the model credible. Those assumptions identify the key variables that 
influence the system under study and help identify how these variables are related 
to each other. The main purpose of this study is to depict a method which may be 
used alternatively or complementary to the current Risk Analysis procedures for 
any construction project that needs in-depth examination of its uncertain impact on 
the environment.  
 
A distinctive characteristic of construction projects is their relatively short life-
cycle, compared with plants and other facilities with repeating processes  
and practices. A construction project is much more dynamic and changeable. This 
actuality presents a tremendous challenge for planners and decision-makers as the 
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implementations of routines and systems have to be done more often and on 
transforming objects.  
 
An obvious advantage of the QRA is that it gives the Environmental Manager hard 
numbers to rely on when arguing for preventive measures and actions. It also 
reduces the degree of random mistakes in the EMS procedures and, if managed 
correctly, replicates the reality in a detailed and consistent way which together 
with knowledge and sound judgment optimizes environmental management. A 
QRA study gives managers an instrument to better conclude how to best allocate 
resources. An activity that mistakenly is heavily controlled for might actually need 
less attention with less cost and vice versa. These kinds of situations can be 
depicted and clarified through QRA.  
 
A limiting factor for the use of QRA is the large amount of information needed to 
perform an analysis. Either based on historical data or subjective assumptions, the 
risk assessment requires a substantial basis to present relevant results. Another 
challenge for contractors would be to perform unique analyses for each and every 
construction project, since they have different conditions and types of impact on 
the environment.  
 
The DEL-159 project meets or exceeds all environmental regulations so far, which 
is aligned with Skanska’s environmental policy. The current environmental 
procedures at the Shaft 10 construction site is profound and efficient As it seems, 
one of the most important objectives of Gottlieb Skanska’s EMS is to avoid 
environmental disasters and bad publicity. The company’s relatively high exposure 
to operative risks related to the environment and safety issues would suggest a 
proactive approach in handling these kinds of risks, where QRA could come to 
play an important part. The worldwide implementation of EMS at all Skanska units 
in the late nineties was not cheap, and it shows the emerging importance of 
environmental issues as factors in corporate strategic planning.  
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Skanska Organizational Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.skanska.com 
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 Skanska USA Civil Operating Units 
 
 
Operating unit Location Specialization 
 
Slattery Skanska 
 
Queens, New York 
Rail transportation projects, 
tunnels and water pollution 
control plants 
Gottlieb Skanska  
Queens, New York 
Power generating facilities, 
road and rail tunnels 
 
Koch Skanska 
 
New Jersey 
 
Bridges and other support 
structures for transportation 
agencies 
 
Tidewater Skanska 
 
Virginia 
Bridges and other support 
structures for transportation 
agencies 
 
Fairfield Skanska 
 
Virginia 
Bridges and other support 
structures for transportation 
agencies 
 
Atlantic Skanska 
Atlanta, Georgia Wastewater treatment plants 
and rail maintenance 
facilities 
 
Yeager Skanska 
California Highways, dams, bridges, 
airport and flood control 
structures. 
 
Tidewater Skanska 
Cortez, Colorado Water filtration plants, 
bridges, roads, drydocks, 
tunnels, cement plants and 
natural gas treatment plants. 
 
Nielson Skanska 
Cortez, Colorado Water filtration plants, 
bridges, roads, drydocks, 
tunnels, cement plants and 
natural gas treatment plants. 
 
Bayshore concrete products 
Cape Charles, Virginia Manufactures all types of 
prestressed concrete 
fabrications and 
Underpinning & Foundation 
Maspeth Maspeth, New York  Underpinning and pile 
driving 
Source: http://www.usacivil.skanska.com 
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 Map of East of Hudson Watersheds 
 
 
Source: http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/dep/html/wsmaps.html 
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Plan of the Shaft 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gottlieb Skanska 
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 SHEMS Summary of Significant Environmental Aspects 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gottlieb Skanska SHEMS  p. 20 
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 SHEMS Risk Matrix 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gottlieb Skanska SHEMS  p. 25 
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 Map of construction site 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mapquest, own 
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System Specific Characteristics: Reservoir Standards (mg/L) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rules and Regulations for the protection from contamination, degradation and pollution of the New 
York City water supply and its sources, page 111.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Annual mean Single Sample Maximum 
Alkalinity (mg CaCO3) 
 
≥ 40.00 ≥ 10.00 
Ammonia Nitrogen 
 
   0.05 0.10 
 
Chloride 30.00 40.00 8.00 
 
Nitrate+ 
Nitrate- N 
 
0.30 
0.50 
 
Organic Nitrogen 
 
 
0.50 
0.70 
Sodium 
 
15.00 20.00 
Sulfate 
 
15.00 25.00 
Total Diss. Solids 
 
150.00 175.00 
Total Organic Carbon 
 
6.00 7.00 
Total Susp. Solids 
 
5.00 8.00 
Chlorophyll-a 0.01 0.015 
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Hazop Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Description Activity/ 
Event 
Guide 
Word 
Deviation Possible 
Cause 
Consequences Severity * 
Discharge       
Equipment 
breakage  
 
 
   ** 
*** 
 
 Excavator less of  
more of 
part of 
seal  
pressure 
missing 
wear out  
over-use 
no maintenance 
Leakage of oils 
and/or gasoline to the 
ground 
3 
 Trucks less of  
more of 
part of 
seal  
pressure 
missing 
wear out  
over-use 
no maintenance 
Leakage of oils 
and/or gasoline to the 
ground 
3 
 Cars less of  
more of 
part of 
seal  
pressure 
missing 
wear out  
over-use 
no maintenance 
Leakage of oils 
and/or gasoline to the 
ground 
3 
 Drills less of  
more of 
part of 
seal  
pressure 
missing 
wear out  
over-use 
no maintenance 
Leakage of oils 
and/or gasoline to the 
ground 
3 
 Crane less of  
more of 
part of 
seal  
pressure 
missing 
wear out  
over-use 
no maintenance 
Leakage of oils 
and/or gasoline to the 
ground 
3 
Spillage from 
workers handling  
hazardous 
substances 
     
** 
*** 
 
 Manual 
work 
Less of 
More of 
Caution 
 
Not 
trainedenough 
overworked 
 
Leakage of hazardous 
substances to the 
ground 
3 
Solid materials       
 Wooden  More of 
 
Overfull 
container 
 
Not emptied 
regularly  
  
Wooden trash in 
reservoir 
0,5 
  Metal  More of Overfull 
container 
 
Not emptied 
regularly  
 
Pieces of metal in 
reservoir 
0,5 
  bricks More of Overfull 
container 
 
Not emptied 
regularly  
 
Bricks or pieces of 
bricks in reservoir 
0,5 
 Miscellaneo
us 
Less of 
 
Less of 
Caution 
 
Bins 
Not 
trainedenough 
overworked 
unawareness 
Miscellaneous 
materials in reservoir 
0,5 
 
 
Source: SHEMS, tour on construction site 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* On a scale from 1-10  
** The probability of water contamination increases with the exogenous factor “rain” for these items.  
*** These discharges can reach the water either through the drainage system, through the soil or above the soil.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Description Activity/ 
Event 
Guide 
Word 
Deviation Possible 
Cause 
Consequences Severity* 
Hazardous waste     ** 
*** 
 
 PCB Less of Caution 
 
Not trained 
enough 
overworked 
PCB in reservoir 10 
 Mercury Less of Caution 
 
Not trained 
enough 
overworked 
Mercury in reservoir 10 
 Leaded 
point 
Less of Caution 
 
Not trained 
enough 
overworked 
Leaded pain in 
reservoir 
10 
 Asbestos 
material 
Less of Caution 
 
Not trained 
enough 
overworked 
Asbestos material in 
reservoir 
6 
Soil erosion       
Mud sliding      **  
 Cars More of 
More of 
Activity 
 
Normal Mud in reservoir 0,5 
 Excavator More of 
More of 
Activity 
 
Normal 
 
Mud in reservoir 0,5 
 Trucks More of 
More of 
Activity 
 
Normal 
 
Mud in reservoir 0,5 
 Crane More of 
More of 
Activity 
 
Normal 
 
Mud in reservoir 0,5 
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Fault Tree 
 
 
Source: Interview, tour on construction site 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
Discharges in 
Reservoir
Excavator 
Wood 
Drill Crane Car Truck 
Rain 
Oils/Gasoline and other 
substances
Solid Material from 
containers
Hazardous Waste 
Spillage 
Metal Bricks 
Miscellaneous 
Leakage from 
barrel
Soil Erosion from  
Activities on site
Asbestos 
Material 
Leaded paint Mercury PCB 
Worker 
Rain
Cars Trucks Excavator Crane 
Machine Activity 
Rain
* These discharges can 
reach the water either 
through the drainage system, 
through the soil or above the 
soil 
* *
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Cumulative Distribution Diagrams for uncertain Activities 
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